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REPORTS OF CASES 
DETERMINED IN 
THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF CALI FORNI A 
[38 C.2d 1; 237 P.2d 6] 
[L. A. No. 21881. In Bank. Nov. 2, 1951.] 
JOHN J. REITANO, .Appellant, v. LEON R. Y.ANKWICH 
et al., Respondents. 
[1] Appeal-Right of Review-Loss of Right-Compliance With 
Judgment.-One who pays a judgment against him under com-
pulsion, such as under execution, does not thereby lose his 
right to appeal from the judgment. 
[2] Id,___;Right of Review-Loss of Right-Compliance With Judg-
ment.-Although execution has not issued under a judgment, 
payment thereof will be regarded as compulsory and therefore 
as not releasing errors or depriving the payor of his right to 
appeal, unless payment be by way of compromise and settle-
ment, or under an agreement not to appeal, or under circum-
stances leaving only a moot question for determination. (Dis-
approving contrary statements in Hurt v. Bauer, 37 Cal.App. 
109, 173 P. 601; Morneault v. National Su1·ety Co., 37 Cal.App. 
285, 174 P. 81; Chur'chill v: More, 7 Cal.App. 767, 96 P. 108; 
People's Home Savtngs Bank v. Sadler, 1 Cal.App. 189, 81 
P.1029; Everts v. Matteson, 46 Cal.App.2d 14, 115 P.2d 207.) 
[3] !d.-Right of Review-Loss of Right-Satisfaction of Judg-
ment.-Mere payment of a judgment does not constitute a 
satisfaction, in the sense that the litigation was intended to 
be ended thereby, within Code Civ. Proc., § 1049, describing 
an action as pending until final determination upon appeal, 
or until the time for appeal has passed, unless the judgment 
is sooner satisfied. 
[1] See 2 Cal.Jur. 227; 2 Am.Jur. 975. 
McK. Dig. Reference: [1-3] Appeal and Error, § 104. 
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MO'l'ION to dismiss an appeal from a judgment of the 
Superior Court of Los .Angeles County. William B. McKes-
son, Judge. Motion denied . 
.Aaron Sapiro and Edwin M. Rosendahl for .Appellant. 
David Mellinkoff for Respondents. 
CARTER, J.-Plaintiff and appellant commenced an action 
for libel and slander against two defendants. .A judgment of 
dismissal, that plaintiff take nothing and pay costs and counsel 
fees was rendered as to defendant Y ankwich following the 
sustaining of demurrers. Thereafter, a similar judgment was 
rendered as to defendant Cheleden. .After entry of the first 
judgment, Yankwich 's counsel wrote to plaintiff's counsel de-
manding payment of the costs and attorney's fees or other-
wise he would be "forced" to levy execution. Plaintiff's 
attorney replied by letter enclosing the amount of the costs 
and attorney's fees, and stating that he understood it would 
cover the costs. Yankwich 's counsel received the payment 
and filed a satisfaction of judgment. 
Plaintiff appeals from both judgments. Yankwich moves 
to dismiss the appeal as to him on the ground that a satisfied 
judgment will not be reviewed on appeal. 
It has been generally stated that the voluntary satisfaction 
of a judgment forecloses the right to have it reviewed on 
appeal. The problem has been discussed as involving a moot 
question, the lack of the existence of a controversy, inconsist-
ency of position and that a satisfaction of judgment puts an 
end to the case. In many of the cases where the statement 
has been made the rule being applied is: ''That the voluntary 
acceptance of the benefit of a judgment or order is a bar to 
the prosecution of an appeal therefrom .... [It] has no 
application where the benefits accepted are such that appel-
lant is admittedly entitled to them or would not be affected 
or put in jeopardy by the appeal." (Schubert v. Reich, 36 
Cal.2d 298, 299 [223 P.2d 242] .) (See Stein v. Simpson, 
37 Cal.2d 79 [230 P.2d 816] ; In 1·e Baby, 87 Cal. 200 [25 P. 
4-05, 22 .Am.St.Rep. 239] ; People v. Burns, 78 Cal. 645 [21 P. 
540] ; Estate of Shaver, 131 Cal. 219 [63 P. 340] ; Patterson v. 
Keeney, 165 Cal. 465 [132 P. 1043, .Ann.Cas. 1914D 232] ; 
Warner Bros. Co. v. Freud, 131 Cal. 639 [63 P. 1017, 82 
.Am.St.Rep. 400] ; Prel?.tzsky v. Pacific Co-operative C. Co., 
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195 Cal. 290 [232 P. 970] ; Mt. Shasta Power Corp. v. Dennis, 
66 Cal.App. 186 [225 P. 877] ; Union Lithograph Co. v. Bacon, 
179 Cal. 53 [175 P. 464]; Graham v. Alchian, 51 Cal.App. 263 
[197 P. 134]; Morton v. Superior Court, 65 Cal. 496 [4 P. 
489] .) 
A distinction has been made, however, between an appel-
lant receiving the fruits of a judgment and one paying a 
judgment. (Hartke v. Abbott, 106 Cal.App. 388 [289 P. 206] ; 
Patterson v. Keeney, supra, 165 Cal. 465; Union Lithograph 
Co. v. Bacon; st£pra, 179 Cal. 53; Warner Bros. Co. v. Freud, 
supra, 131 Cal. 639.) 
[1] Thus when there has been a payment of the judgment 
by the appellant, he does not lose his right to appeal if it is 
compulsory, such as under execution or other coercion. (Hal-
lett v. Slaughter, 22 Cal.2d 552 [140 P.2d 3]; Alamitos Land 
Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 217 Cal. 213 [17 P.2d 998]; Buckeye 
Refining Co. v. Kelly, 163 Cal. 8 [124 P. 536, Ann.Cas. 1913E 
840] ; Kenney v. Parks, 120 Cal. 22 [52 P. 40] ; Knight v. 
Marks, 183 Cal. 354 [191 P. 531] ; Sunset Lumber Co. v. Bach-
elder, 167 Cal. 512 [140 P. 35, Ann.Cas. 1916B 664]; Patter-
son v. Keeney, st£pra, 165 Cal. 465; Vermont Marble Co. v. 
Black, 123 Cal. 21 [55 P. 599]; Yndart v. Den, 125 Cal. 85 
[57 P. 761]; Warner Bros. Co. v. Frmtd, supra, 131 Cal. 639; 
Preluzsky v. Pacific Co-operative 0. Co., supra, 195 Cal. 290; 
Hartke v. Abbott, supra, 106 Cal.App. 388; Burgess v. Cali-
fornia Mut. B. & L. Assn., 210 Cal. 180 [290 P. 1029] ; Levin 
v. Saroff, 54 Cal.App. 285 [201 P. 961] ; Everts v. Matteson, 
46 Cal.App.2d 14 [115 P.2d 207] .) 
Where the payment is voluntary this court has recently 
stated the rule : ''It is established in this state that the general 
rule that the voluntary satisfaction of a judgment deprives a 
party of the right of appeal is subject to certain other well-
settled principles of law .... In the case of voluntary satis-
faction of a judgment, deprivation of the right to appeal 
ensues only when it is shown that the payment of the judg-
ment was by way of compromise or with an agreement not to 
take or prosecute an appeal." (Estate of Merrill, 29 Cal.2d 
520, 524 [175 P.2d 819] .) That rule has support in other 
cases. (Metcalf v. Drew, 75 Cal.App.2d 711 [171 P.2d 488]; 
Hartke v. Abbott, S1£pra, 106 Cal.App. 388; Warner Bros. Co. 
v. Frmul, s1tpra, 131 Cal. 639; Patterson v. Keeney, supra, 165 
Cal. 465.) [2] Moreover, it has been said: " ... it is diffi-
cult to conceive how his [appellant's] payment of the judg-
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ment can give rise to any estoppel against his seeking to avoid 
it for error .... The better view, we think, is, that though 
execution has not issued, the payment of a judgment must be 
regarded as compulsory, and therefore as not releasing errors, 
nor depriving the payor of his right to appeal, unless payment 
be by way of compromise and settlement or under an agree-
ment not to appeal or under circumstances leaving only ·a 
moot question for determination." (Freeman on Judgments, 
§ 1165, p. 2410.) That statement was quoted with approval 
in Warner Bros. Co. v. Frettd, supra, 131 Cal. 63~. (See, also, 
2 Am.Jur., Appeal and Error, § 221; 29 L.R.A. (N.S.) 22; 
4 C.J.S., Appeal and Error, § 214b.) 
There have been contrary statements. (Hurt v. Bauer, 37 
Cal.App. 109 [173 P. 601]; Morneault v. National Surety Co., 
37 Cal.App. 285 [174 P. 81]; Churchill v. More, 7 Cal.App. 
767 [96 P. 108], dictum; People's Home Savings Bank v. 
Sadler, 1 Cal.App. 189 [81 P. 1029], dictum; Everts v. Matte-
son, supra, 46 Cal.App.2d 14, dictum.) The contrary state-
ments in the last cited cases are out of harmony with the 
authorities cited above and must be considered as disapproved. 
In the foregoing authorities, section 1049 of the Code of 
Civil Procedure was invoked,* but it was held not to foreclose 
the right of appeal where the payment of the judgment by 
appellant was compulsory (Kenney v. Parks, supra, 120 Cal. 
22; Prelnzsky V. Pacific Co-operative a. Co., supra, 195 Cal. 
290; Metcalf v. Drew, supra, 75 Cal.App.2d 711; Vermont 
Marble Co. v. Black, sttpra, 123 Cal. 21; Yndart v. Den, supra, 
125 Cal. 85) and the same has been held where the payment 
was voluntary. (Warner Bros. Co. v. Freud, supra, 131 Cal. 
639; Hartke v. Abbott, supra, 106 Cal.App. 388.) [3] It may 
be said that there has been no satisfaction under section 1049 
in the sense that it was intended that the litigation was to be 
at an end-the right of appeal waived. Brochier v. Brochier, 
17 Cal.2d 822 [112 P.2d 602], in saying that a satisfaction 
is the end of a proceeding adds nothing for it was not con-
cerned with the right to appeal. 
In the instant case there is no indication that the payment 
of the judgment for costs was by way of compromise or pur-
suant to an agreement not to prosecute an appeal. The main 
*Code Oiv. Proc., § 1049, provides: ''An action is deemed to be pend-
ing from the time of its commencement until its final determination upon 
appeal, or until the time for appeal has passed, unless the judgment is 
sooner satisfied.'' 
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portion of the judgment~~the merits of the case-that plain-
tiff take nothing, is the part under attack on appeal. 
The motion to dismiss the appeal is denied. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, 
J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
[S. F. No. 18398. In Bank. Nov. 2, 1951.] 
VERNON REYNOLDS, a Minor, etc., et al., Appellants, 
v. JOHN MELVIN FILOMEO et al., Respondents. 
[1] Automobiles- Contributory Negligence- Guests.- An auto-
mobile driver's negligence is not imputable to his guests. 
[2] !d.-Province of Court and Jury-Lights.-In an automobile 
accident case, plaintiffs are entitled to have the jury determine 
whether the headlights of defendant's automobile were burning 
at all times pertinent to the accident, notwithstanding his testi-
mony that they were, where an inference that they were not 
could properly be drawn from evidence that, although the night 
was clear and one plaintiff's vision unobstructed, he did not 
see the lights of such car until it was "a foot away." 
[3] !d.-Speed-Statutory Provisions.-N o change in substantive 
law relating to prima facie speed limits (Veh. Code, § 511) 
was made by Stats. 1947, ch. 1256, § 5, p. 2770, amending Veh. 
Code, § 758, describing the prima facie limit on a signposted 
area as that stated on the sign. 
[4a, 4b] !d.-Province of Court and Jury-Speed-Business Dis-
trict.-The prima facie speed limit for a business or residen-
tial district does not apply in an unsignposted area; hence, 
in the absence of evidence that an area in which an automobile 
accident occurred was signposted, there is no jury question 
with respect to any alleged violation of the prima facie speed 
[1] Negligence of driver of automobile as imputable to passenger, 
note, 90 A.L.R. 630. See, also, 2 Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp. 552; 5 Am.Jur. 
769. 
[3] See 2 Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp, 177; 5 Am.Jur. 645. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Automobiles, § 144; [2] Automobiles, 
§ 277; [3] Automobiles, § 94; [4] Automobiles, § 275; [5] Auto-
mobiles, § 189-1; [6, 7] Automobiles, § 273; [8] Automobiles, § 96; 
[9] Automobiles, § 275; [10, 11] Automobiles, § 217; [12] Negli-
gence, § 29; [13] Negligence, § 150; [14] Automobiles, § 273a. 
